I defend a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's notion of religious (or ethical) attitude in the Tractatus, one that rejects three key views from the secondary literature: firstly, the view that, for Wittgenstein, the willing subject is a transcendental condition for the religious attitude; secondly, the view that the religious attitude is an emotive response to the world or something closely modelled on this notion of emotive response; and thirdly, the view that, although the religious and ethical pseudo-propositions of the Tractatus are nonsensical, they nevertheless succeed in expressing the religious attitude endorsed by Wittgenstein. In connection to the first, I argue that the notion of willing subject as transcendental condition is abandoned by Wittgenstein in the Notebooks and is no longer a feature of his position in the Tractatus. In connection to the second, I argue that the religious attitude is dispositional rather than emotive for Wittgenstein: it is a disposition to use signs in a way that demonstrates one's conceptual clarity. Finally, in connection to the third, I argue that the religious or ethical attitude is strongly ineffable in that it cannot be described, expressed or conveyed by language at all.
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And there is nothing in the entries that do feature them (i.e. that do so separately) to suggest that Wittgenstein views these expressions as equivalent. In other words, there is nothing in the Notebooks to suggest that 'metaphysical subject' is synonymous with, or even analogous to, 'willing subject' for Wittgenstein.
But there is a second and more fundamental problem with arguing that the metaphysical subject of TLP 5.641 is the willing subject of the Notebooks. For TLP 5.641 starts off by noting that 'there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about' the metaphysical subject. In the original, this reads: 'Es gibt also wirklich einen Sinn, in welchem in der Philosophie nicht-psychologisch vom Ich die Rede sein kann.' The mention of 'die Rede' in the original makes it clear that Wittgenstein's claim is that it is possible to speak about the metaphysical subject. What is more, Wittgenstein appears to be suggesting that one of the tasks of philosophy is to continue talking about such a subject. If the metaphysical subject were the willing subject from the Notebooks, however, this would be deeply puzzling, however. For Wittgenstein would be advancing that the willing subject is a transcendental condition of the world (a limit in this sense), that the willing subject can be talked about, and that philosophers should continue talking about it. But such a position would surely be untenable for Wittgenstein: if the metaphysical subject were indeed the willing subject from the Notebooks, Wittgenstein should, at the very least, admit, in TLP 5.641, that the metaphysical subject cannot be talked about. The claim that the metaphysical subject 'really' ('wirklich') can be talked about, especially in conjunction with the suggestion that it is one of the tasks of philosophy to talk about such a subject, is totally mysterious if we understand 'metaphysical subject' to be referring to the willing subject from the Notebooks. After all, ! 9! be no reason whatsoever to posit a willing subject. In other words, in NB 19.11.16, Wittgenstein is considering abandoning the notion of willing subject in its entirety: he is considering abandoning the notion of a transcendental subject understood as a condition of representation or of ethics. I propose that Wittgenstein does indeed end up abandoning this notion in or shortly after November 1916 -and certainly before he starts working on the final version of the Tractatus.
That Wittgenstein's approach to ethics and religion undergoes a significant change precisely around this time is corroborated by his correspondence with Paul Engelmann. Wittgenstein's thoughts about the willing subject develop most rapidly during the weeks he spends with Engelmann, whom he meets in Olmütz in October
1916
. 10 We know that many of the conversations between Wittgenstein and Engelmann during this period focus on Schopenhauer's approach to ethics, an approach that posits a transcendental notion of the subject very much like that of the 'willing subject' from the Notebooks. 11 The strongly Schopenhauerian remarks from the Notebooks end abruptly in late November 1916, with the two entries I mentioned above (NB 9.11.16 and NB 19.11.16) 12.10.16; 15.10.16; 17.10.16; 20.10.16; 4.11.16; 9.11.16; and 19.11 Wittgenstein's reply to Engelmann betrays an important change in Wittgenstein's attitude to (and tolerance of) the transcendental approach to religion and ethics that had been the focus of so many of his conversations with Engelmann in Olmütz, in the autumn of 1916.
A likely explanation for this change would be that, having explored the Schopenhauerian, transcendental approach in depth in his conversations with Engelmann, Wittgenstein had, during the time they had spent apart, concluded that this approach should in fact be discarded: the notion of transcendental willing subject has ended up 'falling apart in his hands'.
13 I therefore propose that, by the winter of 1917 -1918, when Wittgenstein is
These letters are cited in Monk, R. Wittgenstein suggests that our mastery of the formal concept of proposition -that is, the mastery demonstrated in the use we make of propositional signs to express propositions -is ineffable: it manifests itself in our use of propositional signs, but it cannot itself be described by means of propositions. This is an idea we will return to below. c) Contingency, necessity and the sense of absolute control
As we will see below, propositions, like thoughts, are representing facts for Wittgenstein (TLP 3.14 & TLP 3.12) ! 14! For Wittgenstein, the process in which the Tractatus engages us aims at the clarification of formal concepts, notably those of proposition, thought and picture. In particular, this process, when successful, culminates in our coming to use signs -linguistic, psychical or iconic -in such a way as to reflect that there is no necessity outside logic (TLP 6.37).
More specifically, this process culminates in a use signs that reflects that:
a) The world is fundamentally contingent b) The notion of causal necessity is nonsensical c) The notion that human beings are in absolute control of certain facts (i.e. in the kind of control that implies causal necessity) is nonsensical As we will see shortly, these three positions are intimately connected to each other, for Wittgenstein: treating the world as fundamentally contingent involves treating the notions of causal necessity and of absolute control as nonsensical. I will return to this below.
Before I do so, however, I would like to address an initial objection that emerges at this point. 19 The objection can be put as follows: why exactly should the acceptance of the view that the world is fundamentally contingent go hand in hand with a rejection of the notions of causal necessity and absolute control? After all, some have argued that the fundamental contingency of the world is in fact compatible with both causal necessity and with the notion of absolute control. Simone Weil, for instance, holds both that the world is fundamentally contingent and that it is governed by causal necessity. Indeed, the possibility of combining these two notions is central to her project of attempting to
I am grateful to Anthony O'Hear for his generous discussion of this objection.
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reconcile God as creator with the existence of suffering in the world. For Weil, the world is fundamentally contingent in that it could have failed to obtain, since the initial creation of the world is an exercise in God's freedom in love. In so far as the creation of the world results from God's absolute freedom, the world could not have obtained at all -it is in this respect that the world is fundamentally contingent, for Weil. Nevertheless, the world thus created is a world that is governed by causal necessity -and that must indeed be so if
God's ontological independence is to be safeguarded. In order to understand Wittgenstein's rejection of causal necessity, it is important to revisit his approach to contingency, as it emerges in the treatment he gives to pictures and Let us briefly consider iii) and iv). Senseful propositions purport to convey information about reality -information that may be unknown to some language speakers.
Communicating new senses to each other is a central purpose -and part of the essenceof senseful language. Indeed, the informativeness of a proposition goes hand in hand with its sensefulness. Propositions are informative in that they depict possible states of the world, possible ways in which reality might be; but that is precisely why they are senseful. The information conveyed by a senseful proposition may turn out to be false, if the depicted possible state does not obtain as a fact in reality. Nevertheless, the main purpose of senseful language is to be informative and speakers use senseful propositions to convey to others information that may be new to them.
It belongs to the essence of the proposition that it should be able to communicate a new sense to us. (TLP 4.027)
In connection to this it is important to note that, according to Wittgenstein, the natural sciences aim to produce true informative senseful propositions. Natural scientists aim to produce contingently true, informative descriptions of the facts that make up reality: facts that could have happened not to obtain and that could be unknown to language speakers.
In spite of this aim, some of the propositions produced by the natural sciences are, of course, false. After all, sometimes the natural sciences get things wrong: sometimes they make mistakes and produce false descriptions of reality (as, for instance, with the pre-Copernican view that the sun revolves round the earth). Nevertheless, their aim (their purpose) is to produce propositions that are contingently true and therefore informative. It with this in mind that Wittgenstein writes, in the Tractatus:
The totality of true propositions is the whole of the natural sciences (or the whole The Causal Necessity View rejected by Wittgenstein suggests that facts (elements of reality) can be necessarily connected to each other, not by virtue of conceptual relations between them, but by virtue of certain laws of nature governing reality. Imagine that A is an obtaining possible state, a fact; and imagine further that A causes possible state C also to obtain as a fact. Advocates of the Causal Necessity View would argue that, if A really is the cause of C, then A necessitates or entails C. However, this necessary connection, this relation of entailment, is not, in their view, one that arises by virtue of the conceptual relations between A and C. Imagine, for instance, that the presence of a flame (under certain specified circumstances) causes a piece of wax to melt. In other words, imagine that there is a genuine causal relation between these two obtaining possible states.
Advocates of the Causal Necessity View would suggest that, in this scenario, the presence of the flame (under the specified circumstances) necessitates or entails the melting of the wax. In their view, however, this necessary relation of entailment arises, not by virtue of any conceptual relations between the two possible states, but by virtue of something else -namely, by virtue of the fact that certain laws of nature govern reality. And this, in turn, involves shedding a particular understanding of ourselves as being in absolute control of certain aspects of the world. For the notion of absolute control -of being able causally to guarantee the obtaining or non-obtaining of certain facts -is fuelled by that of causal necessity. So much so that the misconceived sense of being in absolute control vanishes when we recognise the notion of causal necessity as nonsensical: when we come to 'see the world aright' (TLP 6.54). Our sense of being in absolute control vanishes when the process of conceptual clarification of the Tractatus succeeds in fine-tuning our linguistic and thinking abilities, so that our use of signs comes to reflect the fundamental contingency of facts.
For further details, see Tejedor (Forthcoming) op. cit, note 14.
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In Wittgenstein's view, therefore, the process of conceptual clarification of the Tractatus results, when successful, in our coming to recognise as nonsensical both the notion of causal necessity and the related notion that we -human beings -are in absolute (i.e. causally necessitating) control of certain aspects of the world.
There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. Wittgenstein suggests that, given the fundamental contingency of facts, it is a source of profound wonder that any possible state should obtain as a fact. This sense of wonder arises in connection to all facts: physical facts (involving the rocks, plants, animals and human physical bodies we describe in language and think about) but also mental facts (i.e. our thoughts, desires, beliefs, emotions and, more broadly, our minds and empirical selves). Being clear in one's grasp of certain formal concepts involves being disposed to use signs in particular ways so as to reflect the fundamental contingency of facts. But this involves treating ourselves (i.e. human beings) as facts on a par, with respect to their contingency, with all other facts in the world. For Wittgenstein, using signs in such a way as to reflect that we (empirical selves) are exactly on a par with all other facts in the world is displaying a religious attitude to the world. So being conceptually clear -in particular, avoiding the illusion of absolute control -is having a religious or ethical attitude of wonder at the fundamental contingency of the world. b) A non-emotive, dispositional religious attitude For Wittgenstein, using signs in such a way as to reflect the fundamental contingency of facts is displaying a religious, ethically correct attitude to the world. But how exactly are we to understand this notion of religious attitude? Here, it is important to emphasise that, for Wittgenstein, the religious or ethical attitude is not an emotive attitude: the ethicoreligious attitude does not involve experiencing certain emotive responses to the world. But what I mean is that a state of mind, so far as we mean by that a fact which we can describe, is in no ethical sense good or bad. If for instance in our world-book we read the description of a murder […] . Certainly the reading of this description might cause us pain or rage or any other emotion, or we might read about the pain or rage caused by this murder in other people when they heard of it, but there will simply be facts, facts, and facts but no Ethics. [My italics] (LOE, 11)
The religious or ethical attitude is not a form of emotive response. For emotions are mental facts that have, in and of themselves, no ethical dimension: mental facts are ethically neutral. 27 Instead, I suggest that the religious or ethical attitude is dispositional, for Wittgenstein: it is the disposition to use signs in such a way as to reflect the fundamental contingency of all facts. Having a religious or ethical attitude to the world is being clear about certain formal concepts, it is having certain practical abilities honed in, so as to be disposed to use signs in particular ways. Being in such a state of conceptual clarity might cause one to experience certain emotions, but these emotions, in and of themselves, do not constitute the ethical attitude. These emotions are epiphenomenal to the ethico-religious attitude: they are phenomena that tend to accompany the attitude (at
In particular, the religious attitude is not the type of emotive attitude characterised by the abandoning or letting go of desire. For desire ('the empirical will that is of interest only to psychology' -TLP 6.423) is also factive for Wittgenstein, and, therefore, in and of itself, devoid of either positive or negative ethical value. Note indeed that both pursuing desire and attempting to let go of desire can be done out of an illusory sense of absolute control and therefore be unethical. not. For, as we saw above, the religious or ethical attitude is precisely one of conceptual clarity; and attempting to express or communicate such conceptual clarity through a nonsensical -that is a conceptually confused -use of signs has to be self-defeating.
Indeed, a nonsensical use of signs is usually the symptom of conceptual confusion -not the mark of conceptual clarity. And nonsense tends to breed further nonsense; this is For Wittgenstein, the ethico-religious attitude is a disposition to use signs in such a way as to reflect the fundamental contingency of facts: it is a disposition to use signs in way that demonstrates one's mastery of -one's clarity in -certain formal concepts. We demonstrate our mastery of formal concepts whenever we use signs to express senseful propositions and whenever we refrain from using signs to produce nonsense. In this respect, it could perhaps be argued that senseful language -senseful language as a whole 
In this respect, they do not have the kind of relation to the attitude in question that sentences might bear to the emotions they express: emotive sentences can be viewed as expressing emotions without distorting them in this fundamental way.
to express and that all we say about the absolute miraculous remains nonsense. […] I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very essence. (LOE 11) Senseful language cannot be regarded as a marker for the ethical attitude in that senseful language as a whole -the totality of senseful propositions -fails to pick out anything in particular. But this simply goes to show that the ethical attitude cannot be conveyed in language in any way. Ultimately, for Wittgenstein, the reason for this is that approaching something (here a certain attitude) as if it could be conveyed in language (if only we could find 'the correct expressions'), is already treating it as non-ethical. Approaching something as if it can be conveyed in language is already treating it from the perspective of the natural sciences, rather than that of ethics. This emerges clearly in Wittgenstein's discussion of the notion of a miracle, in 'A Lecture on Ethics' (LOE 10).
Language -whether senseful language as a whole or nonsensical propositions -is incapable of conveying the ethico-religious attitude. The problem is not merely that propositions -senseful or nonsensical -cannot say or express such an attitude; the problem is that presenting such an attitude as if it could be conveyed in language (if only we could find 'the correct expressions' -LOE 11) fundamentally distorts its ethical nature. For approaching something as if it can conveyed in language is already approaching it in a factive, non-ethical manner. The Tractatus has an ethical purpose, not because it contains, in the TLP 6.4ff, a series of propositions that express ethical insights in spite of their nonsensicality, but because the book -as a whole -enables us to hone in our mastery of certain formal concepts. The process of conceptual clarification in which the Tractatus engages us leads us, when successful, to using signs in such a way as to reflect the fundamental contingency of facts; and since the ethico-religious attitude is precisely the disposition to use signs this way, successfully engaging in this process is, in and of itself, undergoing a powerful ethical transformation, in Wittgenstein's view.
The question of how, according to Wittgenstein, the Tractatus succeeds in delivering this process of conceptual clarification is a complex one that cannot, for reasons of space, be addressed here. ! 34! of the Tractatus involves reminding us that any given arrangement of signs can be used in different ways to produce senseful, senseless and nonsensical propositions. In this respect, I suggest that the sentences in the TLP 6.4ff are put to us so that we exercise our linguistic muscles (our practical linguistic abilities) against them. Note indeed that these sentences can be read in different ways. Consider for instance the claim, in TLP 6.431, that 'at death the world […] comes to an end'. If we read this as an attempt to comment on the death of the transcendental willing subject, the proposition thus expressed is nonsensical, since the notion of willing subject is plain nonsense Wittgenstein. If, in contrast, we read the sentence as asserting that the physical world ended with the death of some particular empirical self, the sentence expresses a contingently false senseful proposition. The point here is that a sentence such as 'at death the world […] comes to an end' (TLP 6.431) can be read in a myriad of ways; but what we learn, by considering different readings -different uses -of this sentence, is that none of them genuinely preserves the apparent ethical dimension of the sentence. When the sentence is interpreted in a way that renders it nonsensical, any purported ethical insight falls a part in our hands; when it is interpreted in a way that renders it senseful, it becomes factive and altogether loses its ethical edge. 31 This is just as it should be since, for Wittgenstein, Sentences also lose any purported ethical edge when they are used to express senseless tautologies and contradictions, as I discuss in Tejedor (Forthcoming) op. cit, note 14.
